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Abstract
Variational autoencoders (VAEs) have recently been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks,
wherein they are fooled into reconstructing a chosen target image. However, how to defend against
such attacks remains an open problem. We make significant advances in addressing this issue
by introducing methods for producing adversarially robust VAEs. Namely, we first demonstrate
that methods used to obtain disentangled latent representations produce VAEs that are more
robust to these attacks. However, this robustness comes at the cost of reducing the quality of the
reconstructions. We, therefore, introduce a new hierarchical VAE, the Seatbelt-VAE, which can
produce high–fidelity autoencoders that are also adversarially robust. We confirm the capabilities of
the Seatbelt-VAE on several different datasets and with current state–of–the–art VAE adversarial
attacks.
1. Introduction
Variational autoencoders (VAEs) are a powerful approach to learning deep generative models and
probabilistic autoencoders [1, 2]. However, previous work has shown that they are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks [3–5], whereby an adversary attempts to fool the VAE to produce reconstructions
similar to a chosen target by adding distortions to the original input as shown in Fig 1. This kind of
attack can be harmful in applications where the encoder’s output is used downstream, as in [6–11].
Further, VAEs are often themselves used to protect classifiers from adversarial attack [12, 13]. Thus,
ensuring VAEs are robust to adversarial attack is an important endeavour.
Despite these vulnerabilities, little progress has been made in the literature on how to defend VAEs
from such attacks. The aim of this paper is to investigate and introduce possible strategies for
defence. Further, we seek to defend VAEs in a manner that maintains reconstruction performance.
Our first contribution towards this aim is to show that regularising the variational objective (i.e. the
ELBO) during training can lead to more robust VAEs. Specifically, we leverage ideas from the
disentanglement literature [14] to improve VAEs’ robustness by learning simpler and smoother
representations that are less vulnerable to attack. In particular, we show that the total correla-
tion (TC) term used into encourage independence between the dimensions of the learned latent
representations [15–17], also serves as an effective regulariser for learning robust VAEs.
Though a clear improvement over the standard VAE, a severe drawback of this approach is that the
gains in robustness are coupled with drops in the reconstruction performance, due to the increased
regularisation. Furthermore, we find that the achievable robustness with this approach can be limited
(see Fig 1) and thus potentially insufficient for particularly sensitive tasks. To address this, we
introduce a new TC–regularised hierarchical VAE: the Seatbelt-VAE. By using a richer latent space
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Figure 1: Adversarial attacks on CelebA for different
models. Here we start with the image of Hugh Jackman
and introduce an adversary that tries to produce recon-
structions that look like Anna Wintour. This is done by
applying a distortion (third column) to the original image
to produce an adversarial input (second column). We can
see that the adversarial reconstruction for the Vanilla VAE
looks substantially like Wintour, indicating a successful
attack. Adding a regularisation term using the β-TCVAE
produces an adversarial reconstruction that does not look
like Wintour, but it is also far from a successful recon-
struction. Our proposed model, the Seatbelt-VAE, is
sufficiently hard to attack that the output under attack
still looks like Jackman, not Wintour. Note that the
Seatbelt-VAE further provides a clearer reconstruction for
the original image.
representation than a standard VAE, the Seatbelt-VAE can learn models which are not only even
more robust to adversarial attacks than those just using TC regularisation, but can also provide
reconstructions which are comparable to, and often even better than, the standard VAE.
To summarize, our key contributions are that we provide insights into what makes VAEs vulnerable
to attack and how we might go about defending them. We unearth new connections between
disentanglement and robustness to adversarial attack. We demonstrate that regularised VAEs,
trained with an up-weighted total correlation, are significantly more robust to adversarial attacks
than vanilla VAEs. Finally, we introduce a regularised hierarchical VAE, the Seatbelt-VAE, that
provides further robustness to adversarial attack while providing improved reconstructions.
2. Background
2.1 Variational Autoencoders
Variational autoencoders (VAEs) are a deep extension of factor analysis suitable for high-dimensional
data like images [1, 2]. They introduce a joint distribution over data x and latent variables z:
pθ(x, z) = pθ(x|z)p(z), where pθ(x|z) is an appropriate distribution given the form of the data, the
parameters of which are represented by deep nets with parameters θ, and p(z) = N (0, I) is a common
choice for the prior. As exact inference is intractable, one performs amortised stochastic variational
inference by introducing an inference network for the latent variables, qφ(z|x), which often also takes
the form of a Gaussian, N (z|µφ(x),Σφ(x)). We can then perform gradient ascent, with respect to
both θ and φ, on the evidence lower bound (ELBO)
L(x) = Eqφ(z|x) [log pθ(x|z)]−KL(qφ(z|x)||p(z)), (1)
using the reparameterisation trick to take gradients through Monte Carlo samples from qφ(z|x).
2.2 Attacking VAEs
In an adversarial attack, an agent is trying to manipulate the behaviour of some model towards a
goal of their choosing, such as fooling a classifier to misclassify an image through adding a small
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perturbation [18, 19]. For many deep learning models, very small changes in the input, imperceptible
to the human eye, can produce large changes in the model’s output.
Attacks on VAEs have been proposed where the adversary looks to apply small input distortions
that produce reconstructions close to a target adversarial image [3–5]. An example of this is shown
in Fig 1, where a standard VAE is successfully attacked to turn Hugh Jackman into Anna Wintour.
The current most effective mode of attack on VAEs is known as a latent space attack [3–5]. This
aims to find a distorted image x∗ = x + d such that its posterior qφ(z|x∗) is close to that of the
agent’s chosen target image qφ(z|xt). This implies that the likelihood pθ(xt|z) is high given draws
from the posterior of the adversarial example. It is particularly important to be robust to this attack
if one is concerned with using the encoder network of a VAE as part of a downstream task. For a
VAE with a single stochastic layer, the latent-space adversarial objective is [3, 4]
∆(x,d,xt;λ) = KL(qφ(z|x+ d)||qφ(z|xt)) + λ||d||2, (2)
where we are penalising the L2 norm of d so as to aim for attacks that change the image less. We
can then simply optimise to find a good distortion d.
3. Defending VAEs
Given these approaches to attacking VAEs, the critical question is now how to defend them. This
problem was not considered by prior works. To address it, we first need to consider what makes VAEs
vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We argue that two key factors dictate whether we can perform a
successful attack on a VAE: a) whether we can induce significant changes in the encoding distribution
qφ(z|x) through only small changes in the data x, and b) whether we can induce significant changes
in the reconstructed images through only small changes to the latents z. The first of these relates to
the smoothness of the encoder mapping, the latter to the smoothness of the decoder mapping.
Consider, for the sake of argument, the case where the encoder–decoder process is almost completely
noiseless. Here successful reconstruction places no direct pressure for similar encodings to correspond
to similar images: given sufficiently powerful networks very small changes to embeddings z can imply
very large changes to the reconstructed image; there is no ambiguity in the “correct” encoding of a
particular datapoint. In essence, we can have lookup–table style behaviour: nearby realisations of z
do not necessarily relate to each other and very different images can have very similar encodings.
This will now be very vulnerable to adversarial attacks: small input changes can lead to large changes
in the encoding, and small encoding changes can lead to large changes in the reconstruction. It will
also tend to overfit and have gaps in the aggregate posterior, qφ(z) =
1
N
∑N
n=1 qφ(z|xn), as each
qφ(z|xn) will be sharply peaked. These gaps can then be exploited by an adversary.
We postulate two possible ways to avoid this undesirable behaviour. Firstly, we can try and directly
regulate the networks used by the encoder and decoder to limit the capacity of the system to have
small differences in images induce large differences in latents. Secondly, we can try to regulate the
level of noise in the encoding to indirectly force a smoothness in the embedding. Having a noisy
encoding creates uncertainty in the latent that gives rise to a particular image, forcing similar latents
to correspond to similar images. In other words, we can avoid the aforementioned vulnerabilities by
either ensuring our encode–decode process is sufficiently simple, or sufficiently noisy. The fact that
the VAE is vulnerable to adversarial attack suggests that its standard setup does not sufficiently
encourage either of these to provide an adequate defence. Introducing additional regularisation to
enforce simplicity or noisiness thus provides an intriguing prospect for defending VAEs.
Though, in principle, direct regularisation of the networks (e.g. weight decay) might be a viable
defence in some scenarios, we will instead focus on indirect regularisation approaches as discussed in
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the next section. The reason for this is that controlling the macroscopic behaviour of the networks
through low-level regularisations can be difficult to control and, in particular, difficult to calibrate.
3.1 Disentanglement and Robustness
Recent research into disentangling VAEs [14–17, 20, 21] and the information bottleneck [22, 23] has
looked to regularise the ELBO with the hope of providing more interpretable or simpler embeddings.
This hints at an interesting link to robustness and raises the question: can we use methods for
encouraging disentanglement to also encourage robustness?
Of particular relevance, [14] introduce the notion of overlap in the embedding of a VAE and show
how controlling it is critical to achieving smooth and meaningful latent representations. Overlap
encapsulates both the level of uncertainty in the encoding process and also a locality of this uncertainty:
to learn a smooth representation we not only need our encoder distribution to have an appropriate
entropy, we also want the different possible encodings to be similar to each other, rather than spread
out. They further show that the success of many methods for disentanglement, and in particular the
β-VAE [20, 22], are rooted in controlling overlap. As controlling overlap is exactly what we need to
carry out for our second suggested approach to defending VAEs, we propose to train more robust
VAEs by using the same ELBO regularisers as employed by disentanglement methods.
A further link between disentanglement and robustness is that disentangled representations may often
also be both simpler and more human–interpretable. For example, if we were hypothetically
able to learn an embedding for CelebA where one of the latent variables has a clear and smooth
correspondence with hair colour, then it is likely to be difficult to conduct an adversarial attack to
produce an image with a different hair colour without making substantial changes to this latent. Thus,
not only might disentangled representations be more robust if they induce simpler and smoother
mappings through regularisation, if they encourage human–interpretable features, this should also
make it more difficult to conduct successful attacks from the perspective of human–perceived changes
to the reconstruction. For instance, the definition of a successful attack is rooted in what features of
an image are perceived as important to a human observer: successful attacks are those which change
the qualitative nature of the reconstruction, not those which induce the largest change in individual
pixels. As such, there are strong links between disentanglement and robustness through common
ideas of what it means to manipulate a datapoint such as an image.
3.2 Regularising for Robustness
There are a number of different disentanglement methods that one might consider using to train
robust VAEs. Perhaps the simplest would be to use a β-VAE [20], wherein we up-weight the KL
term in the VAE’s ELBO by a factor β ≥ 1. Indeed this is the approach that has been shown
to most directly relate to overlap, with the value of β transpiring to be directly linked to the
entropy of the encoder [14]. However, the β-VAE only provides disentanglement at the expense
of substantial reductions in reconstruction quality as the data likelihood term has, in effect, been
down-weighted [14–16]. Furthermore, the level of disentanglement it can achieve is lesser than more
recent methods [15, 16].
Because of these shortfalls, we instead propose to regularise through penalisation of a total-correlation
(TC) term [15, 16]. This looks to directly force independence across the different latent dimensions
in aggregate posterior qφ(z), such that the distribution of the data in the latent space (i.e. where
we draw a datapoint at random and then pass it through the encoder) factorises across dimensions.
As we are up-weighting the total correlation by β this is referred to as the β-TCVAE [16]. This
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approach has been shown to provide improved disentanglement to the β-VAE, while also having a
smaller deleterious effect on reconstruction quality.
To be more precise, the TC-decomposition of the VAE objective presented in [15–17, 24, 25] reveals
an explicit a TC term of the variational posterior qφ. The Factor and β-TCVAEs upweight this term,
to produce the variational objective (with β ≥ 1):
Lβ−TCθ,φ;β,x :=Eqφ(z|x)
[
log
pθ(x, z)
qφ(z|x)
]
− (β − 1) KL
(
q(z)||
∏
j
q(zj)
)
, (3)
where j indexes over dimensions, and the TC is the term with prefactor (β − 1). A differentiable,
stochastic approximation to Eqφ(z)[log qφ(z)] has been proposed [16, 17], rendering this decomposition
possible to use as a training objective using stochastic gradient descent. However this is a biased
estimator: it is a nested expectation, for which unbiased, finite–variance, estimators do not generally
exist [26]. Consequently, it has the unfortunate consequence of needing large batch sizes to have the
desired behaviour; for small batch sizes its practical behaviour mimics that of the β-VAE [14].
3.3 Adversarial Attacks on TC-Penalised VAEs
We now consider attacking these TC-penalised VAEs and demonstrate one of the key contributions
of the paper: that empirically this form of regularisation makes adversarial attacks on VAEs via their
latent space harder to carry out. To do this, we first train them under the β-TCVAE objective (i.e.
Eq (12)), jointly optimising θ, φ for a given β. Once trained, we then attack the models using the
methods outlined in Section 2.2. Namely, we use an adversary that tries to find a distortion d to the
input which minimises the attack loss ∆ as per Eq (2).
One possible metric for how successfully such attacks have been is the achieved value reached of the
attack loss ∆. If the latent space distributions for the original input and for the distorted input match
exactly, then ∆ = 0 and the model has been completely fooled: reconstructions from samples from
the attacked posterior would be indistinguishable from those from the target posterior. Meanwhile,
the larger the converged value of the attack loss the less similar these distributions are and thus the
more different the reconstructed image is to the adversarial target image.
We carry our these attacks for dSprites [27], Chairs [28] and 3D faces [29], for a range of β and λ
values. We pick values of λ following standard methodology [3, 4], and use L-BFGS-B for gradient
descent [30]. We also tried varying the dimensionality of the latent space of the model, ‖z‖, but
found it had little effect on the effectiveness of the attack.
In Fig 2 we show the effect on the attack loss ∆ from varying β, averaged over different original
input-target pairs and over different values of ||z||. Note that the plot is logarithmic in the values
of the loss. We see a clear pattern for each dataset that the loss values reached by the adversary
increases as we increase β from the standard VAE (i.e. β = 1). This analysis is also borne out
by visual inspection of the effectiveness of these attacks as shown in Fig 1 and a number of other
example attacks for different datasets, β and ||z||, as shown in Appendix I. We will return to give
further experimental results in Section 5.
An interesting point of note in Fig 2 is that in many cases the adversarial loss starts to decrease if β
is set too large. As β →∞, there is no pressure in the objective to produce good reconstructions,
and the encoder simply focuses on matching the prior regardless of the input.
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Figure 2: Attacker’s achieved loss ∆ (i.e. Eq (2)) for β-TCVAE for different β values and datasets.
Higher loss indicates more robustness. Shading corresponds to the 95% CI produced by attacking 10
images for each combination of ||z|| = {4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128} and taking 50 geometrically distributed
values of λ between 2−20 and 220 (giving 3000 total trials). Note that the loss axis is logarithmic.
β > 1 clearly induces a much larger loss for the adversary relative to β = 1 for all datasets.
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Figure 3: L = 3 Seatbelt-VAE. Shaded lines indicate β-TC factorisation in a given node.
4. The Seatbelt-VAE
We are now armed with the fact that penalising the TC in the ELBO induces robustness in VAEs.
However, TC-penalisation in single layer VAEs comes at the expense of model reconstruction quality
[16]. Our aim is to develop a model that is robust to adversarial attack while mitigating this trade-off
between robustness and sample quality. To achieve this, we now consider instead using hierarchical
VAEs [2, 31–33]. These are known for their superior modelling capabilities and more accurate
reconstructions. As these gains stem from using more complex hierarchical latent spaces, rather than
less noisy encoders, this suggests they may be able to produce better reconstructions and generative
capabilities, while also remaining robust to adversarial attacks when appropriately regularised.
The simplest hierarchical extension of conditional stochastic variables in the generative model is the
Deep Latent Gaussian Model (DLGM) of [2]. Here the forward model factorises as a chain:
pθ(x,~z) = pθ(x|z1)
∏L−1
i=1
pθ(z
i|zi+1)p(zL), (4)
where each pθ(z
i|zi+1) is a Gaussian distribution with mean and variance parameterised by deep nets,
while p(zL) is an isotropic Gaussian. Unfortunately, we found that naively applying TC-correlation
penalisation to DLGM-style VAEs did not confer the improved robustness we observed in single layer
VAEs. We postulate that this observed weakness is inherent to the structure of chain factorisation in
the generative model: this means that the data-likelihood depends solely on z1, the bottom-most
latent variable, and attackers only need to manipulate z1 to produce a successful attack.
To account for this, we instead propose a generative model in which the likelihood pθ(x|~z) depends
on all the latent variables in the chain ~z, rather than just the bottom layer z1. This leads to the
following factorisation of the generative structure (which shares some similarity to that of BIVA [33]):
pθ(x,~z) = pθ(x|~z)
∏L−1
i=1
pθ(z
i|zi+1)p(zL). (5)
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To construct the ELBO, we must further introduce an inference network qφ(~z|x). On the basis of
simplicity and that it produces effective empirical performance, we use a chain factorisation for this:
qφ(~z|x) = qφ(z1|x)
∏L−1
i=1
qφ(z
i+1|zi), (6)
where each conditional distribution qφ(z
i+1|zi) takes the form of a Gaussian. Note that, marginalising
out intermediate zi layers, we see qφ(z
L|x) = ∫ ∏L−1i=1 d zi qφ(~z|x) is a non-Gaussian, highly flexible,
distribution. A summary of the dependency structure for the generative and inference networks is
shown in Fig 3 for the case L = 3.
To defend this model against adversarial attack, we further introduce a TC regularisation term as
per the last section. We refer to the resulting model as the Seatbelt-VAE due to the protection
it confers to adversarial attack. Because we find that, empirically, models of this type struggle
to converge when TC-penalisation is applied to either the bottom-most layer or every layer, the
Seatbelt-VAE only applies a TC-penalisation to the topmost latent variable zL. In other words,
following the Factor and β-TCVAEs, we up-weight the term for zL of the same form as A in Eq (12)
to give
LSeatbeltθ,φ;β,x :=Eqφ(~z|x)
[
log
pθ(x,~z)
qφ(~z|x)
]
− (β − 1) KL
(
q(zL)||
∏
j
q(zLj )
)
(7)
where j indexes over the coordinates in zL.
Similar to analysis in single layer VAEs [15, 16], we can, in fact, reach Eq (7) by exposing this
total-correlation term through an explicit decomposition of the KL (see Appendix C for a derivation).
We see that, when L = 1, the Seatbelt-VAE reduces to a β-TCVAE. We use the β = 1 case as a
baseline in our experiments as it corresponds to a Vanilla VAE for L=1 and for L > 1, β = 1 it
produces a hierarchical model with an augmented likelihood function.
As with the β-TCVAE, training LSeatbeltθ,φ;β,D using stochastic gradient ascent with minibatches of the
data is complicated by the presence of aggregate posteriors qφ(z) which depend on the entire dataset.
To deal with this, we derive a minibatch estimator that is a generalisation to disentangled hierarchical
VAEs of the Minibatch–Weighted–Sampling estimator proposed in the context of β-TCVAEs [16, 17].
As discussed in Section 3.2, this estimator is inherently biased for finite dataset sizes, such that large
batch sizes are required to provide a good estimate of the TC. See Appendix D for further details.
4.1 Attacking Seatbelt-VAE
In the Seatbelt-VAE the likelihood over data is conditioned on all layers, so manipulations to any
layer have the potential to be significant. We focus on simultaneously attacking all layers, noting that,
as shown in the Appendix, this is more effective that just targeting the top or base layers individually.
Hence our adversarial objective for the Seatbelt-VAE is based on the following generalisation of that
introduced in [3, 4] to attack all the layers at the same time:
∆SB(x,d,xt;λ) = λ||d||2 +
∑L
i=1
KL(qφ(z
i|x+ d)||qφ(zi|xt)). (8)
We evaluate the effectiveness attack in two ways. First, we simply measure the adversary’s loss under
the attack objective above. Secondly, we measure the negative adversarial likelihood of a target
image xt given an attacked latent representation z∗. Larger, more positive values of − log pθ(xt|z∗)
correspond to less successful attacks as they correspond to large distances between the target and
the adversarial reconstruction. Highly negative values of this correspond to successful attacks as they
correspond to a small distance between the adversarial target and the reconstruction.
7
2 4 6 8 10
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
lo
g
p
(x
t|z
* )
1e3
-TC
Seatbelt
(a) − log pθ(xt|z∗) Faces
2 4 6 8 10
10
3
10
5
10
7
10
9
10
11
A
dv
er
sa
ria
l L
os
s
-TC
Seatbelt
(b) ∆ Faces
2 4 6 8 10
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
lo
g
p
(x
t|z
* )
1e3
-TC
Seatbelt
(c) − log pθ(xt|z∗) Chairs
2 4 6 8 10
10
4
10
6
10
8
10
10
A
dv
er
sa
ria
l L
os
s
-TC
Seatbelt
(d) ∆ Chairs
Figure 4: Numerically measuring the robustness of Seatbelt-VAEs (L=4) and β-TCVAEs models
for different values of β. Note that the β-TCVAE with β = 1 corresponds to a vanilla VAE and
that L > 1 β = 1 models correspond to hierarchical baselines. We show the negative adversarial
likelihood of a target image xt given an attacked latent representation z∗ for Chairs (a) and 3D
Faces (b) respectively. Larger values of − log pθ(xt|z∗) correspond to less successful adversarial
attacks. We also show the adversarial loss ∆ in subfigures (b) and (d), which have a logarithmic
axis. Shading in results corresponds to the 95% CI over variation for 10 images for each combination
of ||z|| = {4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128} and λ taking 50 geometrically distributed values between 2−20 and
220. As we go to the largest values of β for both Chairs and 3D Faces, ∆ grows by a factor of ≈ 107
and − log pθ(xt|z∗) doubles for Seatbelt-VAE. β-TCVAEs do not experience such a large uptick in
adversarial loss and negative adversarial likelihood. These results tell us that the Seatbelt-VAE can
offer very strong protection from the adversarial attacks studied. See Appendix H.4 for heatmaps
detailing these metrics for a range of Seatbelt depths (i.e varying L).
5. Experiments
We now demonstrate that Seatbelt-VAEs confer superior robustness to β-TCVAEs and standard
VAEs, while preserving the ability to reconstruct inputs effectively. Through this, we demonstrate
that Seatbelt-VAEs are a powerful tool for learning robust deep generative models.
We first expand on experiments in Section 3.3 and perform a battery of adversarial attacks on each
of the introduced models. We randomly sample 10 input-target pairs for each dataset. Following
previous work [3, 4], for each image pair we consider 50 different values of λ geometrically-distributed
from 2−20 to 220. Thus each model undergoes 500 attacks for each attack mode. As before, we used
L-BFGS-B for gradient descent [30]. We perform these experiments on Chairs [28], 3D faces [29],
and CelebA [34]. Additional results for dSprites [20] can be found in Appendices H, I, and J. Details
of neural network architectures and training are given in Appendix E.
We evaluate the effectiveness of adversarial attacks using the attack objective ∆ as before, along
with − log pθ(xt|z∗), the negative likelihood of the target image (xt) given the embedding generated
by the adversary (z∗). Like with ∆, higher values of this metric denote a less successful attack.
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Figure 5: We show the effect of varying β on the reconstructions of TC-penalised models. In
sub-figures (a) and (b) we plot the final ELBO of TC-penalised models trained on the Chairs and 3D
faces, calculated without the β penalisation applied during training. Shading gives the 95% CI over
variation due to variation of ||z|| = {4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128} for β-TCVAE and also L = {2, 3, 4, 5} for
Seatbelt. As β increases L degrades more slowly for Seatbelt-VAE, relative to β-TCVAE, (c) serves
as a visual confirmation of these results. The top row shows CelebA input data. The bottom row, the
reconstructions from a Seatbelt-VAE with L = 4 and β = 20, clearly maintains facial identity better
than those from a β-TCVAE, the middle row: many of the individuals’ finer facial features lost by
the β-TCVAE are maintained by the Seatbelt-VAE. Combined, these plots show the resistance of the
reconstructions of Seatbelt to increasing β is visually perceptible as well as measurable. Substantial
additional visual results are given in the Appendix.
5.1 Visual Appraisal of Attacks
We first visually appraise the effectiveness of attacks on vanilla VAEs, β-TCVAEs, and Seatbelt-VAEs.
As mentioned in Section 1, Fig 1 shows the results of latent space attacks on three models trained on
CelebA. It is apparent that the β-TCVAE provides additional resilience to the attacks compared
with the standard VAE. Furthermore, this figure shows that the Seatbelt-VAE was sufficiently robust
to almost completely thwart the adversary: its adversarial construction still resembles the original
input. Moreover, this was achieved while also producing a clearer non–adversarial reconstructions.
Additional similar examples are provided in Appendix I.
One might expect that attacks targeting a single generative factor underpinning the data would be
easier for the attacker. However, we find that our models protect effectively against this as well. For
example, see Appendix I.1 for plots showing an attacker attempting to rotate a dSprites heart.
5.2 Quantitative Analysis of Robustness
Having ascertained perceptually that the Seatbelt-VAE offers the strongest protection to adversarial
attack, we now demonstrate this quantitatively. Fig H.10 shows − log pθ(xt|z∗) and ∆ over a range
of datasets and βs for the Seatbelt-VAEs with L = 4 and β-TCVAEs. This figure demonstrates that
the combination of depth and high TC-penalisation offers the best protection to adversarial attacks
and that the Seatbelt extension confers much greater protection to adversarial attack than a single
layer β-TCVAE.
In Appendix H.1, we also calculate the L2 distance between target images and adversarial outputs and
show that the loss of effectiveness of adversarial attacks is not due to the degradation of reconstruction
quality from increasing β. We also include results in Appendix H for “output” attacks [4], which we
find to be generally less effective. Here, the attacker directly tries to reduce the L2 distance between
the reconstructed output and the target image. Again, TC-penalised models, and in particular
Seatbelt-VAEs, outperformed standard VAEs.
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Table 1: Robustness of downstream classification tasks under adversarial attack. We consider
classifiers trained either on the reconstructed image (denoted p(y|x˜)) or on the latent representations
(p(y|z)). We show accuracy when the model is attacked, resulting in perturbed embeddings z∗ and
reconstructions (x˜∗). Parentheses show the drop in accuracy resulting from the attack.
Accuracy by Model
Dataset Task VAE β −−TCVAE Seatbelt–VAE
SVHN
p(y|x˜) 0.12 (−0.29) 0.21 (−0.11) 0.33 (−0.09)
p(y|z) 0.13 (−0.27) 0.27 (−0.01) 0.32 (−0.07)
CIFAR10
p(y|x˜) 0.16 (−0.27) 0.19 (−0.11) 0.27 (−0.14)
p(y|z) 0.12 (−0.29) 0.21 (−0.11) 0.33 (−0.09)
We also test VAE robustness to random noise where we noise the inputs and evaluate the model’s
ability to reconstruct the original datapoint. Through this, we are evaluating their ability to denoise
inputs. See Appendix G for an illustration of the denoising properties of TC-penalised models. This
ability to denoise may partially explain these models’ robustness to attacks.
5.3 ELBO and Reconstruction Quality
Though Seatbelt–VAEs offer better protection to adversarial attack than β-TCVAEs, we also motivate
their utility by way of their reconstruction quality. In Fig 5 we plot the final ELBO of the two
TC-penalised models, but calculated without the additional β penalisation that was applied during
training. We further show the effect of depth and TC-penalisation on reconstructions of CelebA.
Both these plots show that Seatbelt-VAEs’ reconstructions are more resilient to increasing β than
β-TCVAEs’. This resilience is both visually perceptible and measurable.
5.4 Protection to Downstream Tasks
Finally, we consider the protection that Seatbelt-VAEs might provide to downstream tasks, noting
that VAEs are often used as subcomponents in larger ML systems [11], or as a mechanism to protect
another model from attack [12, 13]. Table 1 shows results for classification tasks based on using
2-layer MLPs trained on either the embeddings or the reconstructions. Specifically, it shows the drop
in accuracy caused by an adversary that picks a target with a different label and attacks the VAEs’
embedding using the attack objective with λ = 1. We see that Seatbelt–VAEs produced significantly
better accuracies under these attacks.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that VAEs can be rendered more robust to adversarial attacks by regularising the
evidence lower bound. This increase in robustness can be strengthened even further by using our
proposed hierarchical VAE, the Seatbelt-VAE, which uses a carefully chosen generative structure
where the likelihood makes use of all the latent variables. Designing robust VAEs is becoming pressing
as they are increasingly deployed as subcomponents in larger pipelines. As we have shown, methods
typically used for disentangling, motivated by their ability to provide interpretable representations,
also confer robustness. Studying the beneficial effects of these methods is starting to come to the
fore of VAE research [35]. We hope this work sparks further interest in the interplay between
disentangling, regularisation, and model robustness.
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Appendix A. Disentangling VAEs
In a β-VAE [20], a free parameter β multiplies the KL term in the evidence lower bound L(x). This
objective Lβ(x) remains a lower bound on the evidence. Later work has developed the interpretation
of this model: from an information theoretic standpoint [23], and also by finding the prior on p(z)
that would give rise to this objective for β < 1 [36].
Decompositions of L(x) shed light on its meaning. As shown in [15–17, 24, 25], one can define the
evidence lower bound not per data-point, but instead write it over a dataset D of size N , D = {xn},
so we have L(θ, φ,D).
[17] gives a decomposition of this dataset-level evidence lower bound:
L(θ, φ,D) =−KL(qφ(z,x)||pθ(x, z)) (9)
=Eqφ(z,x)
[
log
pθ(x|z)
pθ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
− log qφ(z|x)
qφ(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
]−KL(q(x)||pθ(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
−KL(qφ(z)||p(z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
(10)
where under the assumption that p(z) factorises we can further decompose 4 :
KL(qφ(z)||p(z)) = Eqφ(z)
[
log
qφ(z)∏
j qφ(zj)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
∑
j
KL(qφ(zj)||p(zj))︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(11)
where j indexes over coordinates in z. qφ(z,x) = qφ(z|x)q(x) and q(x) := 1N
∑N
n=1 δ(x− xn) is the
empirical data distribution. qφ(z) :=
1
N
∑N
n=1 qφ(z|xn) is called the average encoding distribution
following [24].
A is the total correlation (TC) for qφ(z), a generalisation of mutual information to multiple variables
[37]. With this mean-field p(z), Factor and β-TCVAEs upweight this term, so we have an objective:
LβTC(θ, φ,D) = 1 + 2 + 3 + B + β A (12)
[16] gives a differentiable, stochastic approximation to Eqφ(z) log qφ(z), rendering this decomposition
simple to use as a training objective using stochastic gradient descent. We also note that A , the
total correlation, is also the objective in Independent Component Analysis [38].
Appendix B. Hierarchical VAEs
In a hierarchical VAE we have a set of L layers of z variables: ~z. However, training DLGMs is
challenging: the latent variables furthest from the data can fail to learn anything informative [31, 32].
Due to the factorisation of qφ(~z|x) and pθ(x,~z) in a DLGM, it is possible for a single-layer VAE
to train in isolation within a hierarchical model: each pθ(z
i|zi+1) distribution can become a fixed
distribution not depending on zi+1 such that each KL divergence present in the objective between
corresponding zi layers can still be driven to a local minima. [32] gives a proof of this separation for
the case where the model is perfectly trained, i.e. KL(qφ(z,x)||pθ(x, z)) = 0.
This is the hierarchical version of the collapse of z units in a single-layer VAE [39], but now the
collapse is over entire layers zi. It is part of the motivation for the Ladder VAE [31] and BIVA [33].
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Appendix C. Derivation of ELBO for Seatbelt-VAEs
Here we derive the Seatbelt–VAE ELBO by decomposition. Specifically, now considering the ELBO
for the whole dataset and using pD(x) to indicate the empirical data distribution, we will obtain:
LSeatbeltθ,φ;β,D = Eqφ(~z|x)pD(x) [log pθ(x|z)]− Eqφ(~z|x)pD(x)
[
L−1∑
i=1
KL(qφ(z
i|zi−1)||pθ(zi|zi+1))
]
−KL(qφ(zL, zL−1)||qφ(zL)qφ(zL−1))−
∑
j
KL(qφ(z
L
j )||p(zLj ))− βKL
(
qφ(z
L)||
∏
j
qφ(z
L
j )
)
(13)
where z0 = x.
We start with the forms of p and q given in the main paper. The likelihood is conditioned on all z
layers: pθ(x|~z).
L(θ, φ,D) =Eqφ(~z,x) log
pθ(x,~z)
log qφ(~z,x)
= Eqφ(~z,x)[log pθ(x|~z)]− Eq(x)[KL(qφ(~z,x)||pθ(~z))] (14)
=Eq(~z,x) log pθ(x|~z)− Eq(x) log q(x) + Eq(~z,x) log pθ(
~z)
q(~z|x) (15)
=Eq(~z,x) log pθ(x|~z) +H(q(x)) (16)
+
∫
dx d z1
L∏
i=2
(d ziqφ(z
i|zi−1))qφ(z1|x)q(x) log p(z
L)
∏L−1
k=1 pθ(z
k|zk+1)
qφ(z1|x)
∏L−1
m=1 qφ(z
m+1|zm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W
So here we have three terms: an expectation over the data likelihood, the entropy of the empirical
data distribution (a constant) and W . We now can expand W to a term involving the prior for
the latent zL and a term involving the conditional distributions from the generative model for the
remaining components of ~z:
W =
∫
dx
L∏
i=1
(d zi)qφ(~z|x)q(x) log p(z
L)
qφ(zL|zL−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T
+
∫
dx
L∏
i=1
(d zi)qφ(~z|x)q(x) log
∏L−1
k=1 pθ(z
k|zk+1)
qφ(z1|x)
∏L−2
m=1 qφ(z
m+1|zm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
. (17)
Now the first term, T is an expectation over the KL divergence between qφ(z
L|zL−1) and p(zL)
T = −Eqφ(zL−1) KL(qφ(zL|zL−1)||p(zL)) (18)
This term T is that which we will perform TC-decomposition on shortly. The remaining part R ,
it that part of W not involving the prior for ‘top-most’ latent variable zL, is now the subject of
our attention. Now we split out the part of R involving the generative and posterior terms for the
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latent variable closest to the data, z1 and the rest:
R =
∫
dx
L∏
i=1
(d zi)qφ(~z|x)q(x) log pθ(z
1|z2)
qφ(z1|x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ra
+
L−1∑
m=2
∫
dx
L∏
i=1
(d zi)qφ(~z|x)q(x) log pθ(z
m|zm+1)
qφ(zm|zm−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rb
. (19)
Like T , the first of these terms Ra is an expectation over a KL:
Ra = −Eqφ(z2,x) KL(qφ(z1|x)||pθ(z1|z2)). (20)
And the rest, Rb , provides the KL divergences in the ELBO for all latent variables other than z
L
and z1. It reduces to a sum of expectations over KL divergences, one per latent variable.
Rb =
L−1∑
m=2
∫
dx
L∏
i=1
(d zi)qφ(z
1|x)q(x)
L−1∏
k=1, 6=m
(qφ(z
k+1|zk))qφ(zm|zm−1) log pθ(z
m|zm+1)
qφ(zm|zm−1) (21)
=−
L−1∑
m=2
∫
dx
L∏
i=1
(d zi)qφ(z
1|x)q(x)
L−1∏
k=1,6=m
(qφ(z
k+1|zk)) KL(qφ(zm|zm−1)||pθ(zm|zm+1)) (22)
=−
L−1∑
m=2
Eqφ(zm+1,zm−1) KL(qφ(z
m|zm−1)||pθ(zm|zm+1)). (23)
Now we have:
L(θ, φ,D) =Eq(~z,x) log pθ(x|~z) +H(q(x)) + Ra + Rb + T (24)
(25)
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Now we wish to apply TC decomposition to the top-most latent variable zL, the KL for which is
term T . Doing this, with j indexes over units in zL.
T =− Eqφ(zL−1)
[
Eqφ(zL|zL−1)[log qφ(z
L|zL−1)− log p(zL) + log qφ(zL)
− log qφ(zL) + log
∏
j
qφ(z
L
j )− log
∏
j
qφ(z
L
j )]
]
(26)
=− Eqφ(zL,zL−1)[log
qφ(z
L|zL−1)
qφ(zL)
]− Eqφ(zL)[log
qφ(z
L)∏
j qφ(z
L
j )
]− Eqφ(zL)[log
∏
j qφ(z
L
j )
p(zL)
] (27)
=− Eqφ(zL,zL−1)[log
qφ(z
L|zL−1)qφ(zL−1)
qφ(zL)qφ(zL−1)
]− Eqφ(zL)[log
qφ(z
L)∏
j qφ(z
L
j )
]
−
∑
j
Eqφ(zL)[log
qφ(z
L
j )
p(zLj )
] (28)
=−KL(qφ(zL, zL−1)||qφ(zL)qφ(zL−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ta
−KL(qφ(zL)||
∏
j
qφ(z
L
j ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tb
−
∑
j
KL(qφ(z
L
j )||p(zLj ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tc
(29)
Where we have used p(zL) =
∏
j p(z
L
j ) for our chosen generative model, a product of independent
unit-variance Gaussian distributions. As in Chen et al. (2018), we choose to weight Tb the total
correlation (for qφ(z
L)) by a prefactor β.
LSB(θ, φ,D, β) = Eq(~z,x) log pθ(x|~z) +H(q(x)) + Ra + Rb + Ta + β Tb + Tc (30)
Giving us the ELBO for Seatbelt-VAEs, Eq (C.1).
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Appendix D. Minibatch Weighted Sampling for zi
As in Chen et al. (2018), applying β-TC decomposition requires us to calculate terms of the form:
Eqφ(zi) log qφ(z
i) (31)
The i = 1 case is covered in the appendix of Chen et al. (2018). First we will repeat the argument
for i = 1 as made in Chen et al. (2018), but in our notation, and then we cover the case i > 1 for
models with factorisation of qφ(~z|x) of Seatbelt VAEs.
D.1 MWS for qφ(z
1): β-TCVAEs
We denote BM = {x1,x2, ...,xM}, a minibatch of datapoints drawn uniformly iid from q(x) =
1/N
∑N
n=1 δ(x − xn). For any minibatch we have p(BM ) = 1N
M
. Chen et al. (2018) introduce
r(BM |x), the probability of a sampled minibatch given that one member is x and the remaining
M − 1 points are sampled iid from q(x), so r(BM |x) = 1N
M−1
.
Eqφ(zi) log qφ(z
i) =Eqφ(z1,x)[logEq(x)[qφ(z
1|x)]] (32)
=Eqφ(z1,x)[logEp(BM )[
1
M
M∑
m=1
qφ(z
1|xm)]] (33)
≥Eqφ(z1,x)[logEr(BM |x)[
p(BM )
r(BM |x)
1
M
M∑
m=1
qφ(z
1|xm)]] (34)
=Eqφ(z1,x)[logEr(BM |x)[
1
NM
M∑
m=1
qφ(z
1|xm)]] (35)
(36)
So then during training, one samples a minibatch {x1,x2, ...,xM} and can estimate Eqφ(z1) log qφ(z1)
as:
Eqφ(z1) log qφ(z
1) ≈ 1
M
M∑
i=1
[log
M∑
j=1
qφ(z
1
i |xj)− logNM ] (37)
and z1i is a sample from qφ(z
1|xi).
D.2 Minibatch Weighted Sampling for qφ(z
i), i > 1: Seatbelt-VAEs
Here we have that q(~z,x) =
∏L
l=2[qφ(z
l|zl−1)]qφ(z1|x)q(x). Now instead of having a minibatch of
datapoints, we have a minibatch of draws of zi−1: Bi−1M = {zi−11 , zi−12 , ..., zi−1M }. Each member of
which is the result of sequentially sampling along a chain, starting with some particular datapoint
xm ∼ q(x).
For i > 2, members of Bi−1M are drawn:
zi−1j ∼ qφ(zi−1|zi−2j ) (38)
and for i = 2:
z1j ∼ qφ(z1|xj) (39)
Thus each member of this batch Bi−1M is the descendant of a particular datapoint that was sampled
in an iid minibatch BM as defined above. We similarly define r(Bi−1M |zi−1) as the probability of
18
selecting a particular minibatch Bi−1M of these values out from our set {zi−1n } (of cardinality N)
given that we have selected into our minibatch one particular zi−1 from these N values. Like above,
r(Bi−1M |zi−1) = 1N
M−1
Now we can consider Eqφ(zi) log qφ(zi) for i > 1:
Eqφ(zi) log qφ(z
i) =Eqφ(zi,zi−1)[logEqφ(zi−1)[qφ(z
i|zi−1)]] (40)
=Eqφ(zi,zi−1)[logEp(Bi−1M )[
1
M
M∑
m=1
qφ(z
i|zi−1m )]] (41)
≥Eqφ(zi,zi−1)[logEr(Bi−1M |zi−1)[
p(BM )
r(BM |x)
1
M
M∑
m=1
qφ(z
i|zi−1m )]] (42)
=Eqφ(zi,zi−1)[logEr(Bi−1M |zi−1)[
1
NM
M∑
m=1
qφ(z
i|zi−1m )]] (43)
Where we have followed the same steps as in the previous subsection.
During training, one samples a minibatch {zi−11 , zi−12 , ..., zi−1M }, where each is constructed by sampling
ancestrally. Then one can estimate Eqφ(zi) log qφ(zi) as:
Eqφ(zi) log qφ(z
i) ≈ 1
M
M∑
k=1
[log
M∑
j=1
qφ(z
i
k|zi−1j )− logNM ] (44)
and zik is a sample from qφ(z
i|zi−1k ). In our model we only need terms of this form for i = L, so we
have:
Eqφ(zL) log qφ(z
L) ≈ 1
M
M∑
k=1
[log
M∑
j=1
qφ(z
L
k |zL−1j )− logNM ] (45)
and zLk is a sample from qφ(z
L|zL−1k ).
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Appendix E. Implementation Details
All runs were done on the Azure cloud system on NC6 GPU machines.
E.1 Encoder and Decoder Architectures
We used the same convolutional network architectures as [16]. For the encoders of all our models
(q(·|x)) we used purely convolutional networks with 5 convolutional layers. When training on single-
channel (binary/greyscale) datasets such as dSprites, 3D Faces, or Chairs the 5 layers took the
following number of filters in order: {32, 32, 64, 64, 512}. For more complex RGB datasets, such as
CelebA, the layers had the following number of filters in order: {64, 64, 128, 128, 512}. The mean and
variance of the amortised posteriors are the output of dense layers acting on the output of the purely
convolutional network, where the number of neurons in these layers is equal to the dimensionality of
the latent space Z.
Similarly, for the decoders (p(x|z)) of all our models we also used purely convolutional networks with
6 deconvolutional layers. When training on single-channel (binary/greyscale) datasets, dSprites, 3D
Faces, or Chairs, the 6 layers took the following number of filters in order: {512, 64, 64, 32, 32, 1}. For
CelebA the layers had the following number of filters in order: {512, 128, 128, 64, 64, 3}. The mean of
the likelihood p(x|·) was directly encoded by the final de-convolutional layer. The variance of the
decoder, σ, was fixed to 0.1.
For β-TCVAE the range of ||z|| values used was {4, 6, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128}. For Seatbelt-VAEs the
number of units in each layer zi decreases sequentially. There is a list z sizes for each dataset, and
for a model of L layers that the last L entries to give ||zi||, i ∈ {1, ..., L}.
{||z||}dSprites ={96, 48, 24, 12, 6} (46)
{||z||}Chairs ={96, 48, 24, 12, 6} (47)
{||z||}3DFaces ={96, 48, 24, 12, 6} (48)
{||z||}CelebA ={256, 128, 64, 32} (49)
(50)
For Seatbelt-VAEs we also have the mappings qφ(z
i+1|zi) and pθ(zi|zi+1). These are amortised as
MLPs with 2 hidden layers with batchnorm and Leaky-ReLU activation. The dimensionality of the
hidden layers also decreases as a function of layer index i:
||h||(qφ(zi+1|zi)) =hsizes[i] (51)
||h||(pθ(zi|zi+1)) =hsizes[i] (52)
hsizes = [1024, 512, 256, 128, 64] (53)
To train the model we used ADAM [40] with default parameters, a cosine decaying learning rate of
0.001, and a batch size of 1024. All data was preprocessed to fall on the interval -1 to 1. CelebA
and Chairs were both downsampled and cropped as in [16] and [41] respectively. We find that using
free-bits regularisation [42] greatly ameliorates the optimisation challenges associated with DLGMs.
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Appendix F. L2 norm of encoder and decoder network weights
Table F.1: Relative change of the L2 of Encoders and Decoders by dataset for β-TCVAE and Seatbelt-
VAE (L = 4) when increasing β from 1 to 10. Recent work shows that for linear autoencoders,
L2 regularisation of the weights corresponds to orthogonality of the latent projections [43]. For
deep models we expect that disentangling is associated with regularised decoders and more complex
encoders. The decoder receives a simpler representation, but building this representation requires
more calculation. As we increase β for β-TCVAEs and Seatbelt-VAEs for Chairs, 3D Faces, and
CelebA the L2 norm increases for the encoder and decreases for the decoder. A more complex encoder
is more difficult to match in the latent space and regularised decoders may be contributing to the
denoising properties seen in the main paper.
Chairs 3D Faces CelebA
β : 1→ 10 β : 1→ 10 β : 1→ 10
Encoder
β-TCVAE +5.0% +19.5% +73.7%
Seatbelt-VAE, L = 4 +1.0% +2.7% +40.2%
Decoder
β-TCVAE -19.4% -15.0% -6.8%
Seatbelt-VAE, L = 4 -7.6% -6.0% -11.4%
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Appendix G. Robustness to Noise
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Figure G.6: Here we measure the robustness of both β-TCVAE and Seatbelt-VAE when Gaussian
noise is added to Chairs, 3D Faces and CelebA; for . Within each plot a range of β values are shown.
We evaluate each model’s ability to decode a noisy embedding to the original non-noised data x
by measuring the distribution of log pθ(x|z) when z ∼ qφ(z|x + a) (a some scaling factor taking
values in {0.1, 0.5, 1} and  ∼ N (0, 1)) for which higher values indicate better denoising. We show
these likelihood values as density plots for the β-TCVAE in (a, c, e) and for the Seatbelt-VAE with
L = 4 in (b, d , f), taking β ∈ {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10} for 3D Faces and Chairs and taking β ∈ {1, 10}
for CelebA. Note the axis scalings are different for each. We see that for both models using β > 1
produces autoencoders that are better at denoising their inputs. Namely, the mean of the density,
i.e. Eqφ(z|x+)[log pθ(x|z)], shifts dramatically to higher values for β > 1 relative to β = 1. In other
words, for both these models, the likelihood of the dataset in the noisy setting is much closer to
the non-noisy dataset when β > 1 across all noise scales (0.1, 0.5, ). Also note that log pθ(x|z) is
generally higher for the Seatbelt-VAE than the β-TCVAE.
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Appendix H. Aggregate Analysis of Adversarial Attack
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(e) 3D Faces Distances
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(f) 3D Faces Losses
Figure H.7: Plots showing the effect of varying β in a β-TCVAE trained on dSprites (a,b), Chairs
(c,d), and 3D Faces (d,e) on: the L2 distance from the adversarial target x
t to its reconstruction
when given as input (target-recon distance) and the L2 distance between the adversarial input x
∗
and xt (adversarial-target distance); and the adversarial objectives ∆. We also include these metrics
for “output” attacks [4], which we find to be generally less effective. In such attacks the attacker
directly tries to reduce the L2 distance between the reconstructed output and the target image. For
latent attacks the adversarial-target L2 distance grows more rapidly than the target-recon distance
(i.e the degradation of reconstruction quality) as we increase β. This effect is much less clear for
output attacks. This makes it apparent that the robustness we see in β-TCVAE to latent space
adversarial attacks is not due the degradation in reconstruction quality we see as β increases. It is
also apparent that increasing β increases the adversarial loss for latent attacks and output attacks.
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H.2 Seatbelt-VAEs
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(a) dSprites Distances
2 3 4 5
5
6
||T
ar
ge
t-R
ec
on
||
2 3 4 5
0
2
4
||A
dv
er
sa
ria
l-T
ar
ge
t||
1e10
2 3 4 5
depth
5
6
2 3 4 5
depth
600
625
650
Latent Space Attack
Output Attack
(b) Chairs Distances
2 3 4 5
2.5
3.0
3.5
||T
ar
ge
t-R
ec
on
||
2 3 4 5
0
2
4
||A
dv
er
sa
ria
l-T
ar
ge
t||
1e10
2 3 4 5
depth
2.5
3.0
3.5
2 3 4 5
depth
1540
1560
Latent Space Attack
Output Attack
(c) 3D Faces Distances
Figure H.8: Here we show the effect of increasing the number of latent variables (depth) for Seatbelt-
VAEs trained on dSprites (a), 3D Faces (b) and Chairs (c) on the L2 distance from the adversarial
target xt to its reconstruction when given as input (target-recon distance) and the L2 distance between
the adversarial input x∗ and xt (adversarial-target distance). We also include these metrics for
“output” attacks [4], which we find to be generally less effective. In such attacks the attacker directly
tries to reduce the L2 distance between the reconstructed output and the target image. For both
modes of attack the adversarial-target L2 distance increases whilst the target-recon distance decreases
with increasing L. This shows that the increase in depth L not only improves reconstructions but
also confers part of Seatbelt models’ robustness.
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H.3 Seatbelt-VAE layerwise attacks
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(a) 3D Faces
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Figure H.9: − log pθ(xt|z˜), z˜ ∼ q(z|x+ d) where d is some adversarial distortion, for Seatbelt-VAEs
trained on (a) 3D Faces and (b) Chairs; over β and L values for latent attacks. We attack the bottom
layer (z1), the top layer (zL), and finally show the effect when attacking all layers (z). Larger values
of − log pθ(xt|z˜) correspond to less successful adversarial attacks. Generally attacking all layers seems
to give the attacker a slight advantage (as seen by the slightly lower − log pθ(xt|z˜) values for Faces
and Chairs).
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H.4 Seatbelt-VAE attacks by model depth and β
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Figure H.10: Here we measure the robustness of TC-penalised models numerically. Sub-figures (a)
and (c) show − log pθ(xt|z∗), the adversarial likelihood of a target image xt given an attacked latent
representation z∗ for Seatbelt-VAEs for Chairs and 3D Faces. Larger likelihood values correspond to
less successful adversarial attacks. Sub-figures (b) and (d) show adversarial loss ∆ for Seatbelt-VAEs
for Chairs and 3D Faces. We show these likelihood and loss values over β and L (total number of
stochastic layers) values for attacks. Note that the bottom rows of all figures have L = 1, and thus
correspond to β-TCVAEs. The leftmost column corresponds to models with β = 1, which are vanilla
VAEs and hierarchical VAEs. As we go to the largest values of β and L for both Chairs and 3D
Faces, ∆ grows by a factor of ≈ 107 and − log pθ(xt|z∗) doubles. These results tell us that depth
and TC-penalisation together, i.e Seatbelt-VAE, can offer immense protection from the adversarial
attacks studied.
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Appendix I. Adversarial Attack Plots
I.1 dSprites Adversarial Attack on a Single Factor
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β-TCVAE, β = 1, ||z|| = 64
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β-TCVAE, β = 2, ||z|| = 64
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
Seatbelt-VAE, β = 1, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
Seatbelt-VAE, β = 2, L = 2
Figure I.11: Latent space attacks on rotation only of a heart-shaped dSprite for β-TCVAEs and
Seatbelt-VAEs for β = {1, 2}. The attacks are conducted by applying a distortion (third column of
each image) to the original image (top first column) to produce an adversarial input (bottom second
column of each image) to try and output the target image (bottom first column). Here we show the
most successful adversarial distortion in terms of adversarial loss for each model. It is apparent that
the Seatbelt model is the most resilient to attack.
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I.2 dSprites Adversarial Attack
I.2.1 β-TCVAEs
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β = 4,||z|| = 16
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6,||z|| = 16
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β = 8,||z|| = 16
Original Original rec. Adversarial
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β = 10,||z|| = 16
Original Original rec. Adversarial
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β = 1,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
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β = 10,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1,||z|| = 64
Original Original rec. Adversarial
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Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
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Original Original rec. Adversarial
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Original Original rec. Adversarial
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β = 10,||z|| = 64
Figure I.12: Latent attacks on dSprites on β-TCVAEs for β = {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10} and ||z|| =
{4, 6, 8, 16, 32, 64}. The attacks are conducted by applying a distortion (third column of each
image) to the original image (top first column) to produce an adversarial input (bottom second
column of each image) to try and output the target image (bottom first column). Here we show the
most successful adversarial distortion in terms of adversarial loss for each model. It is apparent that
β > 1 models are the most resilient to attack.
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I.2.2 Seatbelt-VAEs
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Figure I.13: Latent attacks on dSprites for Seatbelt-VAEs for β = {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10} and L =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The attacks are conducted by applying a distortion (third column of each image) to
the original image (top first column) to produce an adversarial input (bottom second column of each
image) to try and output the target image (bottom first column). Here we show the most successful
adversarial distortion in terms of adversarial loss for each model. It is apparent that β > 1 models
are the most resilient to attack.
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I.3 Chairs Adversarial Attack
I.3.1 β-TCVAEs
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Figure I.14: Latent attacks on Chairs for β-TCVAEs for β = {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10} and ||z|| =
{4, 6, 8, 16, 32, 64}. The attacks are conducted by applying a distortion (third column of each
image) to the original image (top first column) to produce an adversarial input (bottom second
column of each image) to try and output the target image (bottom first column). Here we show the
most successful adversarial distortion in terms of adversarial loss for each model. It is apparent that
β > 1 models are the most resilient to attack.
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I.3.2 Seatbelt-VAEs
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Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 5
Figure I.15: Latent attacks on Chairs for Seatbelt-VAEs for β = {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10} and L = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The attacks are conducted by applying a distortion (third column of each image) to the original
image (top first column) to produce an adversarial input (bottom second column of each image)
to try and output the target image (bottom first column). Here we show the most successful
adversarial distortion in terms of adversarial loss for each model. It is apparent that β > 1 models
are the most resilient to attack with many attacks resulting in reconstructions resembling the original
non-adversarial input.
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I.4 3D Faces Adversarial Attack
I.4.1 β-TCVAEs
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1,||z|| = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2,||z|| = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4,||z|| = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6,||z|| = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8,||z|| = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10,||z|| = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1,||z|| = 6
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2,||z|| = 6
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4,||z|| = 6
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6,||z|| = 6
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8,||z|| = 6
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10,||z|| = 6
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1,||z|| = 8
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2,||z|| = 8
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4,||z|| = 8
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6,||z|| = 8
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8,||z|| = 8
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10,||z|| = 8
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1,||z|| = 16
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2,||z|| = 16
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4,||z|| = 16
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6,||z|| = 16
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8,||z|| = 16
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10,||z|| = 16
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10,||z|| = 32
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1,||z|| = 64
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2,||z|| = 64
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4,||z|| = 64
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6,||z|| = 64
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8,||z|| = 64
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10,||z|| = 64
Figure I.16: Latent attacks on 3D Faces for β-TCVAEs for β = {1, 2, 4, 6, 810} and ||z|| =
{4, 6, 8, 16, 32, 64}. The attacks are conducted by applying a distortion (third column of each
image) to the original image (top first column) to produce an adversarial input (bottom second
column of each image) to try and output the target image (bottom first column). Here we show the
most successful adversarial distortion in terms of adversarial loss for each model. It is apparent that
β > 1 models are the most resilient to attack.
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I.4.2 Seatbelt-VAEs
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 2
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 3
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 4
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 1, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 2, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 4, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 6, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 8, L = 5
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
β = 10, L = 5
Figure I.17: Latent attacks on 3D Faces for Seatbelt-VAEs for β = {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10} and L =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The attacks are conducted by applying a distortion (third column of each image) to
the original image (top first column) to produce an adversarial input (bottom second column of each
image) to try and output the target image (bottom first column). Here we show the most successful
adversarial distortion in terms of adversarial loss for each model. It is apparent that β > 1 models
are the most resilient to attack with many attacks resulting in reconstructions resembling the original
non-adversarial input.
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I.5 CelebA Adversarial Attack
I.5.1 β-TCVAEs
Latent Attacks
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
(a) Latent, β = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
(b) Latent, β = 10
Figure I.18: Latent attacks on CelebA on β-TCVAEs for β = {1, 10} and ||z|| = 32. The attacks
are conducted by applying a distortion (third column of each image) to the original image (top first
column) to produce an adversarial input (bottom second column of each image) to try and output
the target image (bottom first column). Here we show the most successful adversarial distortion in
terms of adversarial loss for each model. It is apparent that β > 1 models are the most resilient to
attack.
I.5.2 Seatbelt-VAEs
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
(a) Latent, β = 1
Original Original rec. Adversarial
Target Adversarial rec. Distortion
(b) Latent, β = 10
Figure I.19: Latent attacks on CelebA on L = 4 Seatbelt-VAEs for β = {1, 10}. The attacks are
conducted by applying a distortion (third column of each image) to the original image (top first
column) to produce an adversarial input (bottom second column of each image) to try and output
the target image (bottom first column). Here we show the most successful adversarial distortion in
terms of adversarial loss for each model. It is apparent that β > 1 models are the most resilient to
attack with many attacks resulting in reconstructions resembling the original non-adversarial input.
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Appendix J. Data Generation from Models
Ancestral Sampling in CelebA
(a) L = 1, β = 1 (b) L = 1, β = 10
(c) L = 4, β = 1 (d) L = 4, β = 10
Figure J.20: Means of the decoder from ancestral sampling in z, for Seatbelt-VAEs with L = {1, 4},
β = {1, 10}. Note that there is a reduction in diversity of the samples for L = 1 (ie a β-TC VAE),
β = 10, which is not the case for the samples from the β = 10 L = 4 Seatbelt-VAE. This illustrates
perceptually that Seatbelt-VAEs are more robust to the degradation in generative model quality as
β increases.
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Latent Traversals for dSprites
(a) Seatbelt-VAE
Figure J.21: Latent traversals in the |z| = 6 top layer of L = 2, β = 2 for a Seatbelt-VAE trained on
dSprites. Note that the traversals do not capture the ground-truth factors of variation. Disentangling
in hierarchical models remains an open problem.
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